RunOpus 5.5repeat 1
Plan-execute-verify on NIST SP 800-63B password rules, current revision
claude-opus-5-5__plan-execute-verify__research-nist-password-rules__r1
Score
0.750
- Cost
- $0.250
- Latency
- 54.1s
- setup 0.0s, grading 0.0s
- Turns
- 13
- Tool calls
- 8
- Subagents
- 0
- Tokens in / out
- 67k / 5.1k
- 43,951 read from cache
Did the design run?
- Run completed: heldharness.run-completedThe environment was built, the architecture returned and grading finished, none of them throwing.
- No API failures: heldharness.apiNo model call failed at the API.
- Every call ended: heldharness.calls-endedEvery call ended with a result, or was stopped by the run's own limits.
- No harness tool denied: heldharness.harness-toolsThe sandbox guard never denied a harness tool, nor a tool the session itself offered.
- Tool servers connected: heldharness.mcp-connectedEvery tool server the harness gave a call was connected when the session started.
- No foreign tool servers: heldharness.mcp-hermeticNo call loaded a tool server the harness did not give it.
- Builtin tools: heldharness.builtin-toolsA check recorded with the run.
- Structured replies arrived: heldharness.structured-outputEvery call that asked for structured output and ran to the end got it.
- No silent fallbacks: heldharness.not-degradedNo phase fell back on a default (an empty plan, a default winner) instead of its output.
- The plan was a plan: heldplan-execute-verify.planThe planner’s reply was read through its schema and held at least one step.
- Every verdict was read: heldplan-execute-verify.verdictsEvery review round ended with a verdict read from the schema reply, not a default.
- The loop did what its verdicts said: heldplan-execute-verify.loopEvery verdict that called for a revision got one, and nothing was revised without such a verdict.
- Each call was shown the right tools: heldplan-execute-verify.toolsThe planner was shown no tools, the verifier the read-only ones, and the executor and reviser the full toolset.
Phases
Drawn from the phase records: timing and cost per call, no tool calls or messages.
| Phase | Duration | Cost | Turns | Tools | Model |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Plan | 17.6s | $0.037 | 2 | 0 | claude-opus-5-5 |
| Execute | 26.3s | $0.142 | 7 | 6 | claude-opus-5-5 |
| Verify | 10.2s | $0.072 | 4 | 2 | claude-opus-5-5 |
The call-by-call replay is not published for this run. Traces are large, so the repository keeps 9 of this run set’s 900 and leaves the rest out; the score, phases and final answer on this page come from the committed run record.
Runs you can replay
- A gate that blocked the right moveGated-execute · Haiku 4.5
- Three proposals beat one agentPropose-select · Haiku 4.5
- A verifier that earned its keepPlan-execute-verify · Sonnet 5.5
- A revision that did not helpPlan-execute-verify · Haiku 4.5
- The control, missing a stepSingle · Haiku 4.5
Record this cell yourself: npm run bench -- run --strategies plan-execute-verify --tasks research-nist-password-rules --models claude-opus-5-5 --repeats 1
Score breakdown
- passtopic single-factor-minimum-length: minimum length of a password used as the only authentication factor (characters)1.00weight 0.10
quote verified in nist-sp800-63b-4
- passtopic maximum-length: the maximum password length verifiers permit (characters)1.00weight 0.10
quote verified in nist-sp800-63b-4
- passtopic composition-rules: imposing composition rules, such as requiring a mix of character types1.00weight 0.10
quote verified in nist-sp800-63b-4
- passtopic periodic-change: requiring subscribers to change their passwords periodically1.00weight 0.10
quote verified in nist-sp800-63b-4
- passtopic password-hints: letting subscribers store a password hint that unauthenticated claimants can see1.00weight 0.10
quote verified in nist-sp800-63b-4
- passtopic security-questions: prompting for knowledge-based authentication or security questions when a password is chosen1.00weight 0.10
quote verified in nist-sp800-63b-4
- passtopic blocklist: checking a new password against a blocklist of commonly used, expected or compromised passwords1.00weight 0.10
quote verified in nist-sp800-63b-4
- passtopic password-managers: allowing password managers and autofill1.00weight 0.10
quote verified in nist-sp800-63b-4
- passtopic salt-length: the length of the salt used when storing passwords (bits)1.00weight 0.10
quote verified in nist-sp800-63b-4
- passtopic hashing-scheme: using an approved password hashing scheme from the latest revision of SP 800-1321.00weight 0.10
quote verified in nist-sp800-63b-4
Penalties
- hallucinated citationCited pages that were never opened×0.75
1 of 2 cited URLs were never opened: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/63/b/4/final
Scorer metadata
- corpus
- {"version":2,"snapshot":"2026-10-01","hash":"0786c624b04f6c85e2ed8a55d4acedd99e4cf2c18632a0ebc22ee969fb3e2263","documents":4}
- opened documents
- ["nist-sp800-63b-4"]
- opened by role
- {"primary":["nist-sp800-63b-4"]}
- displayed share
- {"nist-sp800-63b-4":0.0652,"nist-sp800-63b-3":0.0012,"owasp-authentication":0.0072,"owasp-password-storage":0.0129}
- cited count
- 2
- verified count
- 1
- hallucinated count
- 1
- citation integrity
- 0.5 (50%)
- hallucinated urls
- ["https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/63/b/4/final"]
- answer block
- true
- answer block repaired
- false
- items answered
- 10
- item count
- 10
- field accuracy
- 1
- grounded items
- 10
- field misses
- {}
Final answer
The current revision is NIST SP 800-63B-4. I read it at https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html. The page is dated "Tue, 26 Aug 2025", and its abstract says "This publication supersedes NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-63B." I searched the page for "draft", and the only hits were references to other documents, so this is not a public draft. The CSRC publication page (https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/63/b/4/final) returned a 404, so I couldn't check the revision status there. I didn't open the older Rev 3 page, so I make no claims comparing the two.
All password requirements are in Sec. 3.1.1.2, "Password Verifiers", on https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html:
- Single-factor minimum length: SHALL, 15 characters. The same item says verifiers MAY allow shorter passwords that are only used in multi-factor authentication, but SHALL still require at least eight characters.
- Maximum length: SHOULD, at least 64 characters. Verifiers should permit passwords of at least this length.
- Composition rules: SHALL NOT. Verifiers must not require mixes of character types.
- Periodic change: SHALL NOT. However, verifiers SHALL force a change if there is evidence of compromise.
- Password hints: SHALL NOT. Hints that unauthenticated claimants can see are not allowed.
- Security questions: SHALL NOT. Verifiers must not prompt for knowledge-based authentication or security questions when a password is chosen.
- Blocklist: SHALL. Verifiers must compare a new password against a blocklist of commonly used, expected or compromised passwords. They must compare the whole password and give the reason for any rejection.
- Password managers: SHALL. Verifiers must allow password managers and autofill. They SHOULD also allow pasting.
- Salt length: SHALL, at least 32 bits.
- Hashing scheme: SHOULD, not SHALL as the plan expected. The page says an approved scheme from the latest revision of SP 800-132 (or updated NIST guidance) "SHOULD be used". The separate rule that passwords be salted and hashed with a "suitable" scheme is a SHALL.
{"answers":[
{"topic":"single-factor-minimum-length","keyword":"SHALL","value":"15","quote":"Verifiers and CSPs SHALL require passwords that are used as a single-factor authentication mechanism to be a minimum of 15 characters in length.","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html"},
{"topic":"maximum-length","keyword":"SHOULD","value":"64","quote":"Verifiers and CSPs SHOULD permit a maximum password length of at least 64 characters.","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html"},
{"topic":"composition-rules","keyword":"SHALL NOT","value":null,"quote":"Verifiers and CSPs SHALL NOT impose other composition rules (e.g., requiring mixtures of different character types) for passwords.","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html"},
{"topic":"periodic-change","keyword":"SHALL NOT","value":null,"quote":"Verifiers and CSPs SHALL NOT require subscribers to change passwords periodically.","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html"},
{"topic":"password-hints","keyword":"SHALL NOT","value":null,"quote":"Verifiers and CSPs SHALL NOT permit the subscriber to store a hint (e.g., a reminder of how the password was created) that is accessible to an unauthenticated claimant.","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html"},
{"topic":"security-questions","keyword":"SHALL NOT","value":null,"quote":"Verifiers and CSPs SHALL NOT prompt subscribers to use knowledge-based authentication (KBA)","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html"},
{"topic":"blocklist","keyword":"SHALL","value":null,"quote":"When processing a request to establish or change a password, verifiers SHALL compare the prospective secret against a blocklist that contains known commonly used, expected, or compromised passwords.","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html"},
{"topic":"password-managers","keyword":"SHALL","value":null,"quote":"Verifiers SHALL allow the use of password managers and autofill functionality.","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html"},
{"topic":"salt-length","keyword":"SHALL","value":"32","quote":"The salt SHALL be at least 32 bits in length and chosen to minimize salt value collisions among stored hashes","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html"},
{"topic":"hashing-scheme","keyword":"SHOULD","value":null,"quote":"An approved password hashing scheme published in the latest revision of [SP800-132] or updated NIST guidelines on password hashing schemes SHOULD be used.","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html"}
]}Provenance of the numbers on this page
- run set
- scaffold-or-scale-v1
- models
- Haiku 4.5, Sonnet 5.5, Opus 5.5
- effort
- high
- repeats
- 2
- fixtures
- replay
- runs
- 900 / 900
- strategy cost
- $354.44
- judge cost
- $9.19
- wall clock
- 9h 48m
- git
- fce5807b2d
Cost excludes judge calls, which are tracked separately so a scoring model never flatters or penalises an architecture. Every figure on this site is read from results/ at build time.